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 Abstract 
A global energy transition is underway. Limiting warming to 2°C (or less), as envisaged in 
the Paris Agreement, will require a major diversion of scheduled investments in the fossil-
fuel industry and other high-carbon capital infrastructure towards renewables, energy 
efficiency, and other low or negative carbon technologies.  The article explores the scale of 
climate finance and investment needs embodied in the Paris Agreement. It reveals that there 
is little clarity in the numbers from the plethora of sources (official and otherwise) on climate 
finance and investment. The article compares the US$100 billion target in the Paris 
Agreement with a range of other financial metrics, such as investment, incremental 
investment, energy expenditure, energy subsidies, and welfare losses. While the relatively 
narrowly defined climate finance included in the US$100 billion figure is a fraction of the 
broader finance and investment needs of climate-change mitigation and adaptation, it is 
significant when compared to some estimates of the net incremental costs of decarbonization 
that take into account capital and operating cost savings.  However, even if the annual 
US$100 billion materializes, achieving the much larger implied shifts in investment will 
require the enactment of long-term internationally coordinated policies, far more stringent 
than have yet been introduced. 
 
Policy Relevance Statement 
Maintaining momentum towards fulfilling Article 2 of the UNFCCC – avoiding dangerous 
climate-change – means keeping a sense of perspective on how key financial and investment 
indicators of progress relate to the underlying macroeconomic reality of the task that lies 
ahead. There is a wide gap between the level of rhetorical commitment to mitigating and 
adapting to climate change evident at the Paris COP 21 Climate Summit, and countries’ 
actual on the ground commitments to emission reduction and investment in climate 
resilience, and the policies to bring them about. In particular, major shifts in financial flows 
towards low-carbon energy (renewables and energy efficiency) will be required if this gap is     
to be reduced. 
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 1. Introduction 
The Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, known as COP21 (the 21st 
Conference of the Parties under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
UNFCCC) arrived at an agreement (the Paris Agreement) to keep average global warming 
well below 2°C. A number of new studies were published in the run up to COP 21 that 
included headline figures relating to climate finance and investment needs. There is 
considerable and longstanding debate over the climate finance and investment needs that 
would be needed to achieve this aim.  Indeed, studies  of  the  optimal  cost of  climate 
stabilisation  strategies  offer  a  wide  range  of uncertainty reflecting differences in models, 
methods and economic assumptions. The decision adopting the Paris Agreement reconfirmed 
the existing commitment of the international community to mobilise $100 billion a year in 
assistance for developing countries, but this is only one  estimate,  and  does  not  cover  the  
full  scope  of  climate finance, with that scope itself contested. Perhaps the only fact  on  
which  the  literature  is  agreed,  is that there exists a large climate finance “gap” – a gap 
between current climate-friendly financial flows, and    those that would be needed to achieve 
long term climate stabilisation goals (Bowen, Campiglio, & Herreras Martinez, 2015; 
Fankhauser, Sahni, Savvas, & Ward, 2016; Haites, 2011; Olbrisch, Haites, Savage, Dadhich, 
& Shrivastava, 2011). There are shorter-term ‘specialized’ climate-finance gaps (e.g. up to 
2020; World Bank, 2015) as well as longer-term cumulative climate-related 
investment/incremental investment gaps (e.g. 2010–2050; McCollum et al., 2013). 
 
Studies of the optimal cost of climate stabilization strategies offer a wide range of uncertainty 
reflecting differences in models, methods,  and economic assumptions. 
 
The US$100 billion target contained in the Paris Agreement is only one estimate of climate-
finance requirements, but there are many others with which it may usefully be compared 
(Zadek, 2011). In the run-up to and since COP 21, a number of new studies were published 
that included headline figures relating to climate finance and investment needs. This paper 
reviews the nature and scale of these new estimates as well as other existing literature, in 
order to  explore  the financial  investment  implications  of achieving  the 2°C target. 
 
 In this article, we triangulate some key numbers of climate finance and investment from 
different sources, as   a reality check on the scale of the political and policy challenges ahead. 
We provide some historical background to the meaning and scale of the term ‘climate 
finance’ and climate investment in the context of the UNFCCC, consider some recent shifts 
in perceptions about the  prospects  of  this  finance  becoming  available  and  explore the 
kinds of policy measures that will be required for this to be the case. 
 
2. Climate-related finance and investment.  
Financing climate action has always been a critical part of the politics of the climate 
negotiations since their inception. One of the earliest attempts in the climate negotiations to 
quantify the scale of public and private climate-related finance arose in the context of  
tracking Parties’ commitments  to  the  issue  of  development and transfer of technologies 
(UNFCCC, 2008). Climate finance has grown in the years since then, most markedly since 
2011. At the same time, the initial emphasis on finance for capacity building and mitigation 
projects has been re-balanced towards a more even balance on mitigation and adaptation 
policies, measures, and technologies. 
 
Under the UNFCCC ‘climate-finance’ has evolved from an initial phase with an emphasis on 
short-term and relatively modest flows to a second phase with an emphasis on longer-term 
and more substantial flows. In phase 1 (1994–2009) it referred to ‘funding’ (rather than 
finance) in relation to several agenda items regularly discussed under the Convention. These 
included: adaptation (initially very small amounts), transfer of technology, mitigation, 
national communications and capacity building. Article 11 of the UNFCCC established a 
‘Financial Mechanism’ that is entrusted to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) along with 
other ‘international entities’. Phase 2 (2009–the present) is characterized by an emphasis on 
‘long-term finance’ involving specified financial targets and timetables (e.g.  2014–2020). 
 
The Copenhagen Accord (COP15, 2009) marked the start of phase 2 and coined the term 
‘climate finance’ when  developed  countries  made  a pledge: 
 ‘to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through 
international institutions, approaching USD30 billion for the period 2010–2012 with 
 balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation’; (sometimes referred to as 
Fast Start    Finance) and 
 ‘to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the 
needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, 
public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance’ 
(UNFCCC, 2010, para 8). 
 
A Green Climate Fund was then established in 2011 (COP 17) as an entity under the 
Financial Mechanism. Several specialized (dedicated climate) funds were already established 
including: the Special Climate Change  Fund (SCCF) and the Least Developed Countries 
Fund (LDCF) managed under the Convention; and the Adaptation Fund (AF) managed under 
the Kyoto Protocol, launched in 2001. 
 
The US$100 billion has since become a key policy reference point. It is the current scale at 
which, in terms of climate finance, the international  climate negotiations function  (e.g. 
OECD,   2015). 
 
To facilitate the monitoring of long-term financing under the Convention, a Standing 
Committee on Finance was established at COP 16 in 2010. In line with the UNFCCC 
Standing Committee on Finance’s recommended operational definition, climate finance 
includes ‘all finance that specifically [emphasis added] targets low-carbon or climate-resilient 
development’ (OECD, 2015, p. 10). Climate finance reached US$62 billion per year in 2014, 
up from US$52 billion per year in 2013 (equivalent to an annual average over the two years 
of US$57 billion – Figure 1(a)) (OECD, 2015). These amounts include ‘finance from a 
variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources 
of financing, to support climate change adaptation and mitigation actions in developing 
countries’. The largest share, however, was public finance (Figure 1(a)). 
 
The US$100 billion (Figure 1(b)) is also, according to the OECD, the same order of 
magnitude as the total  public development assistance budget from all donors to all recipients 
for all causes in 2014 (around US$140 billion – Figure 1(c) green and light blue bars).  Total  
 net  financial  flows  (including  market-driven  private  flows) are considerably greater 
bringing the overall  total close  to  $US 600 billion in  2014  (Figure   1(c)). 
 
Figure 1: The scale of (a) OECD defined “mobilized climate finance flows” relative to (b) the 
US$100 billion reference and (c) total (public and private) global development assistance in 
2014 
 
sources: (a) OECD, 2015 (b) OECD, 2016a  
 
Development assistance serves multiple policy objectives. Filtering financial flows to isolate 
‘climate-related’ projects involves a high degree of methodological uncertainty. ‘Climate’ is 
a bundled, multifaceted label (from energy to human health, sanitation, and agriculture). 
Labelling development assistance in this way is not a straightforward accounting practice and 
can be methodologically challenging as finance projects can have multiple objectives (e.g. 
Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011a). It is possible that some of the ‘growth’ in climate-
related finance and investment could be a reallocation and/or relabelling of existing aid flows 
(e.g. Michaelowa & Michaelowa,   2011b).   Nevertheless,   a   proportion   of   this   ODA   
is   officially   marked   as    ‘climate-related’ (despite methodological uncertainties). Total 
 commitments on bilateral and multilateral climate-related development finance commitments 
(from OECD Development Assistance Committee members, Multilateral Development 
Banks (MDBs), and the GEF) in 2014 amounted to approximately US$39 billion (according 
to a recipient perspective), the majority of which was for mitigation projects (Figure 2(a)). 
Around two-thirds of this annual US$39 billion is for energy-, transport- and storage 
(logistics)-related projects (Figure 2(b)). 
 
Figure 2: Breakdown of climate related development finance (a) by climate objective and (b) 
by sector 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2016b  
 
Monitoring, reporting, and verification of climate finance is an administratively complex 
accounting challenge, often characterized by double counting, definitional complexity, and 
methodological incompleteness (Stadelmann, Michaelowa, & Roberts, 2013), resulting in 
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 opacity and inconsistency. Assessing and evaluating financial flows in such circumstances 
are challenging. The following are some of the general sources of methodological uncertainty 
when attempting to understand estimates of climate finance: 
 
 Separating finance directed towards mitigation versus adaptation (climate resilience), 
or both; 
 Accounting for project additionality (the emission reduction below some baseline that 
occurred because of   the project, and the part played by the climate finance in this); 
 Double counting (between different climate    funds); 
 Double counting (markers within funds, e.g. distinguishing between principal climate-
related  objectives  versus  other  secondary benefits to  sustainable development); 
 Accounting for incremental costs: usually the full value of the financial flow is 
captured and not the share associated  with  the  climate-change benefit; 
 Industry association views versus independent estimates of financial flows (in part 
explained by data sensitivity  and confidentiality); 
 Accounting for the general lack of data on national public expenditures. UNFCCC 
notes that there is ‘very little data on national public expenditures for climate-change 
activities, in both developed and developing  countries. With the exception of bilateral 
and multilateral flows for the energy sector, and private sector finance for renewables, 
there is relatively little data on which to base a significant trend’; 
 Accounting for public/private interactions. There are various proxies for ‘mobilized 
finance’. Mobilized finance refers to quantifying the effect of public interventions 
aimed at mobilizing private finance for climate activities. It is technically complex 
and challenging to measure (Jachnik, Caruso, & Srivastava, 2015; UNFCCC,  2014). 
 
Records of finance flows are not nearly as developed or consistent as data on national 
emissions, for  example. UNFCCC (2014) comment on the overall integrity of information 
relating to climate finance: 
None of the global institutions that aggregate or produce data used in this report provide an 
estimate of the level of accuracy associated with their data. At best, they provide a range and 
 the underlying assumptions and methodologies to help the   reader understand how they 
come up with their estimates. (UNFCCC, 2014, para 223, pp. 84–85) 
 
The Standing Committee on Finance conducted its ﬁrst Biennial Assessment and Overview 
of Climate Finance Flows in 2014 (UNFCCC, 2014). It provides an estimate of ﬁnance ﬂows 
of 2010–2012 (Table 1). The report distinguishes: 
 Public and Private ‘global climate finance’ data which includes public and private 
financial resources devoted to addressing climate change globally; and 
 Flows from developed to developing countries aimed at addressing climate change, 
which includes climate finance reported to the   UNFCCC. 
 
Table 1 shows that the changes in financial flows necessary to bring about the low-carbon 
energy transition have tentatively begun. Prior to the Copenhagen COP 15 in 2009, only 
relatively small amounts of finance (in the order of US$ tens of billions) were on the 
UNFCCC negotiating table. These were mostly directed to capacity building to develop, for 
example, national communications, pilot mitigation projects through the financial mechanism 
of the Convention (the GEF, operated by the World Bank). As a project mechanism, the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was exceptional in mobilizing more than US$200–
300 billion in investments (largely   in renewable energy) in developing countries over a 
decade (UNFCCC, 2014, p. 36). 
 
Table 1: estimates of annual global climate finance flows in the period 2010-2012 
Category/Sub Category* US$ billion per year 
Global total climate finance   
(Estimates of global total climate finance include both public 
and private in both developed and developing countries and 
including adjusted estimates of energy efficiency investment. 
This estimate is highly uncertain) 
340-650  
All financial flows from developed to developing countries 
(including both public and private flows of finance) 
40-175 
Flows to developing countries through public institutions  35-50 
 Other official flows ((a) grants or loans from the government 
sector not specifically directed to development or welfare 
purposes and (b) loans from the government sector which are 
for development and welfare, but which are not sufficiently 
concessional to qualify as ODA. These flows are channelled 
through bilateral channels (e.g. IDFC members, OPIC) 
14-15 
MDB finance (MDB flows are adjusted to exclude external 
resources managed by MDBs and funding to economies in 
transition/developing countries.)  
15-23 
Climate related ODA (Bilateral ODA flows are adjusted to 
exclude funding through multilateral climate funds to reduce 
double counting). 
19.5-23 
Multilateral climate funds  1.5 
UNFCC funds (Funds accountable to the UNFCCC COP 
including the GEF, LDCF, SCCF, and the Adaptation Fund)  
0.6 
Source: UNFCCC (2014:7): * The sub-categories are not mutually exclusive and therefore 
some amounts overlap.  
 
The reference US$100 billion number is both a relatively large and small number in relation 
to the 2°C agreement. An additional (‘new money’) US$100 billion per year of climate 
finance by 2020 would significantly increase climate financial flows over this period. It 
would be the equivalent of a 70% increase in the current   total     ODA budget,  or a 
quadrupling of all current adaptation finance flows.  The US$100 billion number corresponds   
to one of the early estimates of the costs to developing countries of adaption to climate 
change (Parry et al., 2009). More recently, some estimates of adaptation finance needs by 
2030 have trebled up to US$300 billion    per year (UNEP, 2016, p. vii). However, relative to  
overall  general  baseline  cumulative  investment  in  the  global economy (e.g. the US$ 
trillions of capital expenditure over the coming decades scheduled on infrastructure, 
including energy, transportation, water, and sanitation systems), US$100 billion is a small 
number (IPCC, 2007, and see  below). 
 
  
Climate finance is required for both mitigation and adaptation projects/investments – i.e. for 
low-carbon (mitigation) and climate-resilient (adaptation) development (e.g. UNFCCC, 2014, 
para 59, p. 33). The climate finance flows required by the Paris Agreement can be compared 
with (a) estimates of business as usual investment flows in energy-related and 
adaptation/climate resilience infrastructure systems and (b) estimates of incremental 
(additional) flows that might be required to meet climate goals. 
 
It is important to consider the relative scale of climate finance in relation to estimates of 
climate investment needs. In general, estimates of investment needs in the areas of mitigation 
and adaptation are the product of fairly rudimentary methods and assumptions. One study of 
investment needs across the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) noted that such methods 
are least well developed in the areas of environment, energy, and climate (Schmidt-Traub,  
2015). 
 
An indirect way of scaling investment needs  is to start with the scale of economic growth. 
For the last 50  years, real global GDP (PPP) has grown at a steady annual average rate of 
3.8% and in 2014 was approximately US$78 trillion (World Bank, 2016). 
 
Average annual GDP growth is currently around 3–4% (2013–2016). The global economy is 
therefore currently growing by around US$2.3–3.1 trillion (current) per year. According to  
one  projection  by  the  OECD, global GDP is expected to grow at around 3% per year over 
the next 50 years, but wide variations are forecast between countries and regions  (OECD,  
2012). 
 
A key component of the increase in global GDP is the net increase in Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (GFCF) in the form of assets such as energy, water and waste systems, and 
infrastructure. The long-term success of achieving the Paris Agreement will be determined by 
the proportion of GFCF that is low carbon (e.g. renewable energy and energy efficiency) 
and/or climate resilient (e.g. cities that can function productively into the future against a 
back drop of regional temperature increases of, for example, 1–3°C by 2070). Rates of GFCF 
 vary widely between countries (from around 5–40% of GDP: World Bank, 2014). New 
Climate Economy (NCE, 2014) estimates overall cumulative global fixed capital formation 
over 2015–2030 at US$400 trillion, or US$27 trillion per year based on historic trends and 
future GDP forecasts (Table 2). The incremental low-carbon and climate-resilient 
components of GFCF are, by definition, a fraction of this overall figure. 
 
Table 2: Annual and periodic estimates of current and future annual cumulative and 
incremental investment flows 
Source Year/ 
Period 
Estimate 
type  
Estimate details Average annual 
investment over period 
(US$ trillion) 
World 
Economic 
Forum (WEF, 
2013) 
2014- 
2020 
Investment Capital investment in 
infrastructure of all kinds 
(water, agriculture, telecoms, 
power, transport, buildings, 
industrial and forestry 
sectors). 
5.0  
 
World 
Economic 
Forum (WEF, 
2013) 
2014- 
2020 
Incremental 
investment  
Additional, incremental 
investment needs of at least 
US$ 0.7 trillion per year to 
meet the climate-change 
challenge.  
0.7  
UNCTAD 
(2014) cited in 
OECD 
(2016c) 
Development 
Cooperation 
Report  
2015-2030 Investment Investment needs for the 
Sustainable Development 
Goals 
Globally: 5.0-7.0 
In Developing Countries: 
3.3-4.5  
The Global 
Commission 
on the 
Economy and 
Climate, New 
Climate 
2015-2030 Investment 
(GFCF) 
Estimate of US$ 400 trillion 
of new investments will be 
made into fixed capital 
formation based on historic 
trends and future GDP 
forecasts. 
$27  
 
 Economy 
Project, 2014 
Report  
(NCE, 2014). 
2015-2030 Investment Cumulative global investment 
in infrastructure (chiefly in 
“energy and cities”) in the 
period up to 2030 $ 89 trillion 
$6.0 
2015-2030 Investment Cumulative global investment 
in energy infrastructure $33.8 
trillion baseline + 11.2 
(incremental to achieve 
climate goals). 
$3.0 
2010 Investment  Global construction spending 
on buildings of the order of  
US$5.4 trillion (in constant 
2005 US$). 
 
$5.4 
2015-2030 Incremental 
investment 
Overall, the net incremental 
infrastructure investment  
needs from a low-carbon 
transition could be just US$ 
4.1 trillion 
$0.27 
IEA, 2015 
(new policies 
scenario)  
2015-2040 Investment Total energy sector 
investment (high and low 
carbon investments including 
both energy supply and 
energy efficiency): U$ 68 
trillion (2014 dollars) 
$2.7 
 
Bloomberg 
New Energy 
Finance 
(2016) 
2015 Investment 2015 clean energy investment 
(all asset classes all clean 
energy sectors) was US$ 330 
bn 
  
$0.33 
UNEP (2016)  2015-2030 Incremental 
investment 
(adaptation) 
adaptation finance needs by 
2030 
$0.1 rising to $0.3 by 
2030 
  
In 2013, the World Economic Forum (WEF) estimated capital investment in the water, 
agriculture, telecom, power, transport, buildings, industrial,  and  forestry  sectors  to  meet  
global  population and economic growth to be US$5 trillion per year in the period up  to  
2020,  of  which  the  additional,  incremental  investment  to meet the climate-change 
challenge was  US$0.7  trillion  per  year.  The  Global  Commission  on  the  Economy and 
Climate has estimated the overall scale of investment in infrastructure (mainly energy and 
cities) in the period up to 2030 at around US$90 trillion (NCE, 2014). The energy 
component is divided into approximately US$2.25 trillion per year baseline and an 
incremental climate-change component of US$0.75 trillion per year. Estimates of energy-
related capital investments required have grown significantly over the last decade. The IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007), for example, estimated that future energy 
infrastructure investment would amount to just US$20 trillion between 2005 and 2030. In 
contrast, according to the IEA’s 2015 World Energy Outlook, world energy sector 
investment in its New Policies Scenario totals US$68 trillion, or US$2.7 trillion per year 
from 2015 to 2040. In the WEO 2015 estimate 37% is in oil and gas supply, 29% in power 
supply and 32% in end-use efficiency. Renewables account for more than 60% of additional 
investment in power generation capacity in the New Policies scenario (led by China, the 
European Union, the United States, and India). 
 
Most of the estimates of overall and energy-related infrastructure requirements for the low-
carbon transition are based on simple arithmetic models. The UNFCCC notes, for example: 
 
For the last twelve years, the IEA has undertaken an annual survey of energy use by sector 
(transport, industry, power and residential) to determine the annual energy demand and 
types of equipment purchased in developed countries and Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS) … The methodologies used  by  the  IEA  and  the  underlying  
assumptions  suggest that their modeling and estimation is more relevant for insights rather 
than accuracy. (2014, p. 30, para 41) 
 
 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF, 2015) estimated that clean energy investment was  
US$329  billion  in 2015 (it has been at or around the US$300 billion per year mark  since  
2012).  This  investment  is  roughly  equally split between OECD  and non-OECD    
countries. 
 
Estimates of future business-as-usual infrastructure investment requirements to realize GDP 
and population growth forecasts vary widely in the literature (Table 2), as do the incremental 
climate change-related components. The various investment estimates are tabulated in Table 
2, and presented graphically in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Various estimates of climate investment (energy and adaptation) flows compared 
with the $US 100 billion reference. 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that, notwithstanding uncertainties and different estimates, total climate-
related financial flows will need to be considerably larger than US$100 billion if the 
aspirations in the Paris Agreement are to be met. The US$100 billion is intended as a target 
 that would help countries (particularly least developed countries) mitigate and adapt where 
they otherwise might not be able to do so. 
 
By contrast, according to the Carbon Tracker Initiative (2015), a total of US$2.2 trillion of 
fossil-fuel-related capital expenditure up to 2025 needs not  to be  approved  in  order  to  
avoid  around  156 GtCO²  of  emissions and remain consistent with a 50% chance of  
meeting  the  UN  2°C  trajectory.  The  breakdown  includes:  thermal  coal  –  over  the  next  
decade,  capital  expenditure  of  US$215  billion  on  new  and  existing   projects unneeded; 
oil – spending of US$1.427 billion on new and existing projects unneeded; gas – capital 
expenditure  of US$532 billion on new and existing projects unneeded. These amount to a 
total of US$0.21 trillion unneeded capital per year over the   period. 
 
Table 3 compares the estimates in Table 2 and Figure 3 with the US$100 billion negotiation 
number, expressing the difference as a multiple of the US$100 billion figure. 
 
Table 3: Scale of the climate investment challenge (factor multiples of the US$100 billion per 
year climate finance policy goal).  
Investment estimate Factor multiple of US$ 100 billion  
Estimated investment in GFCF based on historic trends 
(NCE, 2014) 
270 
Average annual global investment needs to meet the 
sustainable development goals (UNTAD, 2016) 
50-70 
Average annual estimated investment required in 
infrastructure of all kinds (WEF, 2013) 
57 
Average annual estimated investment required in 
energy infrastructure of all kinds (IEA, 2015) 
27 
Average annual Global Climate Finance 2010-2012 
(public and private) (UNFCCC, 2014) 
3.4-6.5 
Average current investment in clean energy (BNEF, 
2015) 
3 
Incremental adaptation annual investment needs by 
2030 (UNEP, 2016) 
3 
NCE (2014) Net Incremental Low Carbon Transition 3 
 Average rate of potentially stranded assets in fossil fuel 
sector (CTI, 2015) 
2 
Global total Overseas Development Assistance, 2014 
(OECD, 2016a) 
1.4 
The Paris Agreement US$100 billion  1 
OECD 2015 estimate of mobilized (public + private) 
climate finance (OECD, 2015) 
0.6 
 
Table 3 shows that, compared to the Paris US$100 billion climate-finance target: 
 Global annual fixed capital formation is of the order of 270 times larger; 
 Global investment needs to meet the SDGs is of the order of 50–70 times larger; 
 Global investment in energy infrastructure is of the order of 27 times larger. 
 
Some types of climate finance are capable of leveraging investment. However the difference 
in scales  between near-term climate finance and future climate investment needs shown in 
Figure 3 suggests  there remains a significant climate finance gap. 
 
3. The green growth opportunity. 
Next, we explore  the overall  economic and welfare impacts of these climate-related  
investment  flows. When deciding how to allocate the emission reductions for 2008–2012 
required under the Kyoto Protocol,   the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) spoke 
explicitly of ‘burden sharing’ and ‘effort sharing’. The Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change (Stern, 2007) stimulated a wider and deeper debate in the economic and 
scientific literature on the costs of mitigation in the run up to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report (IPCC, 2007). One meta-analysis of the range of modelling results for mitigation costs 
for stabilizing GHG gas emissions at 500 ppm gave results for the costs of deep 
decarbonization mainly in the range of 1–4% GDP  (Barker, Qureshi, & Köhler, 2006; cited 
in Stern, 2007, p. 270). These studies typically did not model the benefits of avoided climate 
damage or the co-benefits of mitigation measures, in terms of the reduction of the external 
costs of fossil-fuel use, discussed further below. The Stern Review estimated that the 
potential costs of damage for climate change, up to 20% of global GDP, were far in excess of 
those of climate-change mitigation. 
  
Around the same time, a new discourse was also emerging in the business world around the 
framing of  natural and regulatory risk multipliers, including climate change (e.g. Dobbs, 
Oppenheim, Thompson, Brinkman,  & Zornes, 2011). Record fossil-fuel prices and the 2008 
global financial crisis further propelled the concept of green growth up policy agendas (for 
example, see OECD, 2011). This was then linked to increases in resource productivity of 
factor 4 (von Weizsacker, Lovins, & Lovins, 1998)/factor 5 (von Weizsacker, Hargroves, 
Smith, Desha, & Stasinopoulos, 2009) and factor 10 that had emerged a decade earlier. 
In the lead up to the financial crisis, the oil price had been persistently above US$ 50/bbl 
since the start of 2005 and had climbed steadily, peaking at a record US$ 147/bbl in July 
2008.  The IEA began to speak of an  energy revolution that is ‘necessary and possible’ (IEA, 
2009). The New Climate Economy (NCE) reports more recently have reframed the measures 
required for climate-change mitigation in the language  of  opportunity (NCE, 2014, 2015), 
and ‘green growth’. 
 
Academic interest in green growth strategies dates largely to the turn of the millennium (e.g. 
Ekins, 1999). By 2012 the combination of high commodity prices, financial crisis and 
upgraded risk assessments associated with climate change caused the concept of green 
growth to be adopted as a full-blown political and economic strategy by the major 
multilateral development banks and the OECD (Jacobs, 2012). 
 
Thus, between Copenhagen (COP 15) and Paris (COP21) there was an important change in 
the mood with which the international climate-change negotiations were conducted. Instead 
of ‘burden sharing’ the language was now of ‘low-carbon opportunity’. In part, this was 
because the baselines against which the costs of climatec hange mitigation are compared had 
changed. Many estimates of cost of mitigation are ‘panglossian’ in that   they assume 3% 
GDP growth into the future, even when there is no significant emissions reduction, and 
therefore substantial projected climate change. Such optimistic assessments of future GDP 
growth remain mainstream. The IEA, for example, continues to project  global GDP to grow 
at an average annual rate of 3.5% in       the period 2013–2040 across each of its WEO 2015 
scenarios (IEA, 2015, Table 1.2, p. 37). But such projections assume away one of the main 
 causes of concern about climate change – that it will not have a significant negative impact 
on economic   activity. 
 
The more optimistic discourse about climate-change mitigation derives partly from the fact 
that the policy process is beginning to look critically at the implicit costs of baseline 
scenarios in terms of what happens if there  is no substantial mitigation of climate change. 
The attack on the ‘baseline’ is summarized by Stern (2016): 
So the business-as-usual baseline, against which costs of action are measured, conveys a 
profoundly misleading message to policymakers that there is an alternative option in which 
fossil fuels are consumed in ever greater quantities without any negative consequences to 
growth   itself. 
 
Partly, the present green growth policy discourse is presenting the prospect of four (win-win-
win-win) outcomes: (1) lower energy costs, (2) higher economic growth and employment, (3) 
reduced impacts from climate change, and (4) co-benefits such as reduced air pollution. 
Bottom-up analyses of the cost of financing the low carbon pathway have been estimated at 
about 2–4% of expected capital expenditure up to 2030, with the net increase in financing 
costs being perhaps 0.7–2.3% of total financing for global capital expenditures (Beinhocker 
& Oppenheim, 2016). Such costs are still substantial, and it is possible to overdo the win-win 
rhetoric, but even the high end of this range is around half of the costs to GDP associated 
with high oil prices in the period 2004– 2008. In financial and economic terms, it is now clear 
that in many regions and applications, properly costed, climate-change mitigation 
technologies are becoming increasingly affordable. 
 
The discourse around decarbonization is changing and this is sending a different message to 
markets from even a few years ago: fossil fuels are the energy source of the past; the future is 
low-carbon (actually needs to be zero and negative carbon if the 2°C target, let alone 1.5°C, 
is to be met). 
 
Genuine ‘Green Growth’ (i.e. renewables and energy efficiency) is now the strategic 
decarbonization imperative. Developing countries will not deliver on their Intended 
 Nationally Determined Contributions (their emission reduction commitments in the Paris 
Agreement), let alone make them more stringent, if doing so is perceived to constrain  those  
countries’ economic development. 
 
3.1 The falling cost of renewables 
There has been a rapidly changing technological landscape around renewables. 
Increased public funding for renewable energy R&D, diffusion, and deployment has led 
to a  virtuous  circle  of  cost  reductions,  further  policy support, and technological 
innovation that has achieved a colossal reduction in the cost of renewable energy 
sources in the last decade or so (Trancik, 2014).  The  levelized  cost  of  solar  (PV)  
electricity,  for  example, halved between 2010 and 2014 (Ekins, Bradshaw, & Watson, 
2015; IRENA, 2014, p. 12). Simultaneously, global patents in the field of renewable 
energy have increased dramatically in the last decade. Cost reductions in solar 
technologies mean that it some parts of the world it has already achieved parity with 
electricity from fossil fuels. Coupled with policy makers increased recognition of the air 
pollution costs of fossil fuels, the change in mood at COP21 around climate-change 
mitigation was palpable. Perceptions about baseline policy and technological 
trajectories have a major influence on market dynamics. Several developments at or just 
before COP21 show how it continues to swing away from fossil fuels and towards 
renewables at a pace. An Indian initiative, the International Agency for Solar 
Technologies and Applications, involving some 120 mainly tropical countries, was 
announced at COP21 and aims to reduce the costs of solar technology through 
massively increased deployment around the world. Also at COP21 a number of the 
world’s richest individuals set up the Breakthrough Energy Coalition to accelerate the 
development of innovative low-carbon technologies, while 21 governments established 
Mission Innovation to double the amount of public money going into clean energy 
innovation. 
 
Rapid deployment of renewable energy technologies (together with on-going energy 
efficiency improvements) was in part responsible for global carbon emissions 
remaining relatively flat in 2014/2015 despite an increase in global energy 
 consumption. According to REN21, renewables (predominantly wind, solar PV, and 
hydro power) represented approximately 58.5% of net additions to global power 
capacity in 2014 (2015, p. 17). 
 
3.2 Incremental costs versus incremental investment 
The present value of operating cost savings from reduced fossil-fuel consumption should be 
taken into account when evaluating investments in energy efficiency and renewables. 
Climate-finance analyses can focus on either incremental investment or incremental costs 
(Haites, 2011). Generally incremental investment analysis is much simpler than incremental 
cost analysis as data on lifetimes, future energy prices, operating costs, and discount rates are 
not required. 
 
Renewables have far lower operating costs than fossil-fuel plants, and investments in energy 
efficiency will  also reduce energy-related expenditures in the future (provided they are 
accompanied by policies to prevent     the rebound effect). This is clearly relevant to the 
overall economic impact of any additional  capital  costs incurred by climate mitigation 
investments. Haites (2011, p. 965) points  out that the  ‘estimated  incremental  cost is usually 
much lower than the corresponding incremental investment’. 
 
This difference in operating costs between a low-carbon and fossil-fuel energy system means 
that the scale of annual expenditure on energy and fuel as a proportion of GDP should also be 
considered when the financial implications of these different systems are being compared. 
There are currently no officially published data         at a country by country level on energy 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. As a share of overall global           GDP, energy 
expenditures have been estimated at around 8–9% (IER, 2010). In line with rates of energy 
consumption, the majority of this expenditure is currently on fossil fuels. Some ad hoc 
figures are available for individual countries. For example, in the US it was as high as 13.7% 
in 1981 and stood at 8.3% in 2010 (EIA, 2011). In the UK, energy as a proportion of GDP 
has reduced significantly from around 9% in the late 1970s to 2.8% in   2014 (UK DECC, 
2015). Assuming globally as a whole that energy expenditure lies on average somewhere 
between 3% and 10% depending on energy prices, this would give an upper  and  lower  first  
 guess  at  total global expenditure flow on energy to be of the order of US$2.3–7.8 trillion per 
year. 
 
Surprisingly low estimates of the overall cost of decarbonization in the longer term are 
possible because of   the size of  current  expenditures  on the  fossil-fuel  economy. For  
example, according to  NCE (2014, pp. 3–5) 
A shift to low-carbon infrastructure will have an additional impact, changing both the timing 
and mix of infrastructure investment. A low-carbon transition across the entire economy 
could be achieved with only 5% more upfront investment from 2015-2030 … Overall, the net 
incremental infrastructure investment needs from a low-carbon transition could be just 
US$4.1 trillion, if these investments are done well. 
 
While net cost or incremental methods for assessing investment requirements are contentious 
(Olbrisch et al., 2011), such remarkably small estimates indicate how perceptions about the 
costs and benefits of emissions reduction have begun to change in recent years. 
 
3.3 Environmental fuel taxation  
There are many unpriced externalities associated with fossil-fuel energy consumption. 
Interest in environmental fuel taxation based on full cost accounting is rising. The 
international policy landscape is moving towards including in calculations of energy 
subsidies not just the pre-tax producer and consumer subsidies but estimates that take account 
of the full costs of fossil-fuel  combustion to society, including their full life cycle 
environmental  costs (IMF, 2015). 
 
In 2015 IEA estimated that the value of direct financial fossil-fuel subsidies worldwide was 
US$493 billion (IEA, 2015, p. 96). In contrast, the IMF (2015) estimated total energy 
subsidies (i.e. including external environmental costs) to be US$4.9 trillion (6.5% of global 
GDP) in 2013, and projected them to reach US$5.3 trillion (6.5% of global GDP) in 2015. 
This provides another reference point for the US$100 billion. Fossil-fuel energy subsidies 
(including external environmental costs) are in the order of 53 times larger than the US$100 
billion climate finance number. 
  
According to the IMF, regionally, pre + post-tax subsidies vary as a function of share of coal 
and petroleum in primary energy use as well as exposure of population to combustion 
emissions. Subsidies reach as much as 17–18% of GDP in CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) and Emerging and Developing Asia. In MENA (Middle East,  North 
Africa, Afghanistan,  and Pakistan)  they amount to 13%, predominantly  related to the use  
of petroleum. 
 
According  to  the IMF: 
Eliminating post-tax subsidies in 2015 could raise government revenue by $2.9 trillion (3.6% 
of global GDP), cut global CO2 emissions by more than 20%, and cut premature air 
pollution deaths by  more  than  half.  After  allowing  for  the  higher  energy costs faced by 
consumers, this action would raise global economic welfare by $1.8 trillion (2.2% of global 
GDP). (2015, p. 6) 
 
4. Policy imperatives and approaches: using billions to unlock trillions 
Strong, stable, and sustained public policy is required to achieve the deployment of low-
carbon energy sources    at the required rate to stay within the global temperature limits set by 
the UNFCCC. Incremental investment requirements  and  policy   ambition/effectiveness  are   
interdependent.   Investment  needs   assessments  make assumptions about the baseline 
policy landscape. Policy makes assumptions about finance and  investment  needs, 
opportunities, and gaps. Low-cost incremental investment scenarios such as those by the 
NCE (2014,  2015) to meet climate goals require ambitious and effective climate policies. 
They not only require the rapid wholesale transformation of (for example) the electricity 
system but also substantial system-level impacts as a result of billions of individual 
consumer, investor, company micro decisions favouring lower energy, higher renewable 
futures, higher climate-resilient futures. Climate policy and  incremental  investment  is  a  
chicken  and  egg  problem  (Schmidt-Traub, 2015). 
 
 Climate change is just one part of a broader landscape of investment required to achieve 
sustainability goals. The OECD neatly summed up the overall policy challenge in achieving 
the SDGs as ‘using billions to unlock trillions’ (OECD, 2016c, p. 27). 
 
Very similar typologies of options and policies appear time and again on how best to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions. Frequently, these policy typologies are threefold: carbon pricing; 
the stimulation of innovation and low-carbon technological development and deployment; 
and removing barriers to behavioural change (Grubb, Hourcade, & Neuhoff, 2014; Stern, 
2007). 
 
4.1 The need for consistent policy 
The first priority for low-carbon policy to attract large-scale investment is that it should be 
long term, consistent, predictable, and transparent. The importance of this is illustrated by the 
reduction in investment in renewables brought about by the sudden policy changes by the UK 
government following its election in May 2015. Within a year, the UK, which had routinely 
topped the annual league table compiled by Ernst & Young of countries attractive to 
renewable energy investments had slid to 13th place (Guardian, 2016). Policy-driven 
transitions in energy systems are complex in situ experiments within path-dependent socio-
technical systems. The need for consistent and stable policy environment has been expressed 
in many countries and by stakeholders including investors, suppliers, business users, policy 
makers (e.g. CBI,   2016). 
 
4.2 The importance of carbon and fossil fuel prices and subsidies 
The second important policy priority is that the prices of different energy sources reflect their 
full costs, requiring subsidies for fossil fuels to be removed and their prices to reflect their 
full environmental costs. 
 
It needs to be recognized that an important consequence of an effective Post-Paris  
international  policy regime would be even lower coal, oil, and gas prices. There are 
significant amounts of economically recoverable hydrocarbons and if the demand becomes 
constrained by climate policy – the price is likely to fall. 
  
Private investment is playing and will play a major role in investments in the energy system, 
so investments  will need to make a risk-reflective normal rate of return. The recent collapse 
in fossil-fuel prices has been rapid and deep and is having profound and complex impacts  on 
the investment landscape.  Low oil and  gas  prices  help choke off investment in new fossil-
fuel developments. However, low oil and gas prices, by making clean energy less 
competitive, can also deter or delay investment in clean energy that is intended to substitute 
for current fossil-fuel sources. 
 
However, until consumers get used to low energy prices, there is a potential opportunity to 
introduce carbon pricing at a time when policy and political resistance to it may be lower. For 
example, a US$50 a tonne carbon    tax introduced now, while significantly increasing the 
consumer price, would not raise fossil-fuel prices beyond the levels to which consumers were 
accustomed before 2014 – but this window of potential political feasibility   of a carbon tax 
will fade with the memory of the high oil prices. 
 
Given the underlying strength of demand for fossil fuels (oil and gas in particular) in all 
currently mainstream future energy projections, there will be at some stage a recovery in the 
oil price as supply tightens. In the  absence of alternatives, higher fossil-fuel prices are 
necessary to balance anticipated supply  with  global  demand. As the IEA (2015, pp. 48–49) 
puts   it: 
The relationship between the supply cost curves and oil prices is not straightforward, but the 
inference is that a price in the range of $80–120/barrel is likely to be required to enable 
supply to meet demand in the New Policies Scenario to 2040.  
 
There is therefore much interest in ‘oil price trajectories’. More important perhaps are 
‘carbon price trajectories’ that policy should be attempting to manage. Indeed future patterns 
in the investment landscape are all about   the collisions of at least three inter-related price 
trajectories: oil, carbon, and the levelized costs of renewable/ low-carbon energy. 
 
 Carbon pricing is accelerating. According to World Bank and Ecofys (2016) carbon pricing is 
being applied to around 13% of global emissions – a threefold increase over the last decade. 
China’s plans for a national emissions trading scheme commencing in 2017 will take this 
figure to 25%. As of mid-2015, carbon pricing (tax or cap-and-trade schemes) covered 
around 3.7Gt or 12% of global energy-related CO2 emissions with an aggregate value of US 
$26 billion (IEA, 2015, p. 41) – a 60% increase compared to 2014. The IEA’s current 450 
ppm policy scenario assumes CO2 prices in 2030 (in US $2014) in the range $100–140 per 
tonne in OECD countries with a lower range for the BRICS of US $75–120 per tonne. 
However, the 2°C pathway will require much more widespread  and  aggressive  carbon 
pricing. 
 
In 2015, the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund launched The Carbon 
Pricing Panel with heads of government and supported by private sector leaders to promote 
the use of effective carbon pricing policies.  The following  quote from  World Bank  Group  
President  Jim  Kong Kim neatly sums  up the centrality  of an effective carbon pricing 
regime within the overall frame of green growth strategies: 
There has never been a global movement to put a price on carbon at this level and with this 
degree of unison. It marks a  turning point from the  debate on the economic systems needed 
for  low carbon growth to  the implementation  of policies   and pricing mechanisms to 
deliver jobs, clean growth  and prosperity.  The science  is  clear,  the  economics  
compelling  and  we now see political leadership emerging to take green investment to scale 
at a speed commensurate with the climate challenge. (Carbon Pricing Leadership,   2016) 
 
4.3 The need for support for low-carbon technologies 
In many ways it is remarkable that investment in renewable energy technologies has 
continued at high levels despite the collapse in fossil-fuel prices (BNEF, 2015). However, in 
the presence of widespread subsidies for fossil fuels, and the absence of systematic attempts 
to internalize their external costs, low-carbon energy sources are likely to be more expensive 
than high-carbon energy sources for some time. Under these circumstances, credible policy to 
support the low-carbon energy policy is essential. As already noted, such policy support 
needs to   be consistent,  predictable, and transparent. 
  
Such policy support needs to include large research and development (R&D) programmes as 
well as a range   of policies (Feed-in-Tariffs, portfolio targets, grants) for massive low-carbon 
deployment, to include renewables, nuclear, and carbon capture and storage, depending on 
national priorities, with predictable degression to reflect technological change (Grubb et al.,   
2014). 
 
With all governments now committed to low-carbon technologies in principle, the economic 
prizes for successful commercialization of them are enormous. For example, solutions to the 
problems of electricity storage, revolutionizing the utility of intermittent renewables, and 
learning how best to combine energy system with information and communication 
technologies will create markets worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Similarly, with 
estimates that 60% of the urban infrastructure that will exist in 2050 still needs to be built 
(UNEP, 2013, p. 6), the economic opportunities for the pioneers of more sustainable urban 
forms are very great – but so are the potential  carbon emissions if this urbanization proceeds 
along current trajectories. 
 
4.4 The need for changes in behaviour 
Finally, the low-carbon transition would be made much simpler if increased awareness about 
the threat of  climate change, and the behaviours which contribute  to  it,  led  to  more  
fundamental  behavioural  change.  Two major relevant areas in this regard are the 
installation of energy efficiency measures in buildings, moves       to reduce food waste and 
excessive meat consumption, and producer/consumer alliances to control deforestation  and  
forest degradation. 
 
The importance of the behavioural dimension is a reflection of the fact that climate-change 
mitigation is not only  a  function  of  policy.  The  energy  transition  is  a  complex  
multifaceted  series  of   evolutions/adaptations (Armstrong et al., 2016). Coherent policy 
investment scenarios that take into account behavioural as well as technological change are 
now emerging. One example is a study by The Global Commission on the Economy and 
Climate on an investment scenario, comprising a set of practical recommendations, to 
 achieve most of the emission reductions necessary to remain on the pathway to limiting 
global warming to 2°C by 2030 (NCE, 2015). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Currently there is no prospect of a direct global regulatory approach to limit fossil-fuel 
extraction and use. Therefore, to have a reasonable chance of fulfilling the goal of the Paris 
Agreement of limiting global temperature rise to less than 2°C, the global economy needs to 
rapidly develop non-carbon energy sources that are cheaper, cleaner (e.g. creating less air 
pollution), and more convenient than fossil fuels. This in turn requires an acceleration of 
public and private investment targeted at developing low-carbon energy technologies across 
the innovation curve. To address the wider goal of avoiding excessive damage from climate 
change to which the world is already committed, considerable investments in climate 
resilience are also required to achieve lower cost adaptation strategies. 
 
The key message in this article is that current levels of climate finance are more than an order 
of magnitude smaller than anticipated baseline investment in the climate-related economy in 
the period up to mid-century.  The current scale of climate finance is measured in the US$10–
100 billion per year whereas (a) financial flows in energy and agricultural systems, (b) fossil-
fuel subsidies (c) welfare losses, and (d) potential welfare benefits from investments in a 
low-carbon development pathways – are measured in the US$ trillions per year. 
 
There are some pertinent recent historical examples of countries such as China ramping up 
investments in renewables (to 36% of the global total invested in renewables in 2015) 
through coherent policy packages (e.g. REN21, 2016). The challenges of scaling up climate 
finance to the levels required are awesome and unprecedented. But the benefits of doing so 
are also very large, promising enhanced innovation in clean technologies   and the growth of 
huge new industries from low-carbon investments, and enhanced economic  growth  and  
great increases in human welfare from the removal of fossil-fuel subsidies and the 
internalization of the externalities from their  combustion. 
 
 The Paris Agreement came about because there was increased realization of these benefits 
among policy makers. In some cases, the policies to realize current commitments are lacking. 
Moreover, current commitments do not yet match the targets  in  the Paris   Agreement. 
 
The technology and finance levers to achieve the substantive outcomes desired by the Paris 
Agreement are available. Recognition that deploying them entails more benefits than costs is 
growing. What is now required is that policy makers have the courage to act on this 
recognition in the limited time that is left for the Paris targets to remain within reach. 
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